bisik.
bisik.
Indonesian for whisper. You whisper quotes. The market hears nothing.
A confidential multi-dealer RFQ desk for OTC block trades — native on Canton.
Live on Canton Devnet
Private DeFi & Capital Markets
TradeFi & Tokenized Assets
Agentic Commerce
Build on Canton Hackathon · Encode Club × Canton Foundation
bisik.
The problem
You cannot trade size in the open.
- Post a $4M block on a public venue and the order — plus every competing bid — leaks.
- Front-running, market impact, alpha gone the moment it touches a mempool.
- Today's workaround: OTC desks and chat rooms. Trust a middleman, keep no clean audit trail.
- $30B+ a month still trades this way.
The bind
Fair price discovery requires sealed bids.
A transparent ledger makes sealed bids impossible — unless you bolt on a cryptography stack.
bisik.
Why this build is different
We built this exact product four times, on four chains.
Each time, most of the work was fighting the chain's transparency.
| Project | Chain | Privacy machinery we had to build |
| Diam | Arbitrum (iExec) | TEE confidential compute, encrypted handles |
| Segel | Stellar (Soroban) | Two Circom/Groth16 ZK circuits, hand-rolled Poseidon |
| Sealed Pair | Sui | Walrus blob commitments + Seal threshold encryption |
| Samar | Ethereum (Zama fhEVM) | FHE, branchless FHE.select settlement |
| Bisik | Canton | None. Sub-transaction privacy is the ledger model. |
On Canton, “Dealer B cannot see Dealer A's quote” is not a cryptographic achievement. It is a signatory/observer declaration.
bisik.
What Bisik is
A sealed-bid RFQ desk where the guarantees are code, not a middleman.
- A buyer requests quotes from a chosen dealer panel. The market never sees the RFQ.
- Each dealer answers with a sealed quote — rival dealers never receive it.
- The dealer's asset locks into escrow: it cannot be double-sold mid-auction.
- The buyer awards: cheapest ask wins, paid the second-cheapest price (reverse Vickrey).
- Settlement is atomic DvP — cash and asset move together or not at all.
- A regulator observes executed trades — and only executed trades.
Why Vickrey
Winner is paid the runner-up's price, so dealers can quote their true reserve without shading.
On a transparent chain this needs ZK or FHE. Here it is ~40 lines of Daml.
Three settlement rails
Competitive Vickrey · direct bilateral OTC · partial fills on both. Plus multi-instrument baskets, atomically.
bisik.
The money shot
Dealer A has quoted. Dealer B's column stays empty.
Three views of one ledger. Not a masked row. Not a “hidden bid” placeholder. Nothing — the quote was never transmitted to Dealer B's node.
bisik.
The whole privacy layer
This is the entire mechanism.
template RFQ signatory buyer, observer invitedDealers
— the market never sees it
choice SubmitQuote dealer locks the asset into escrow + seals a quote
template Quote signatory dealer, buyer — NO other observers
— rivals never RECEIVE it (physically, not by policy)
template EscrowedHolding signatory issuer+dealer, observer buyer
— dealer cannot double-sell or pull it back alone
choice Award cheapest ask wins, paid the SECOND price (Vickrey);
atomic DvP in one transaction; losers archived unrevealed
template TradeReport observer regulator — post-trade only
No circuits. No ceremony. No trusted hardware. The privacy is the data model.
bisik.
The institutional payoff
Provable best execution — with no public order book.
- Counterparties selectively disclose their sealed asks to the regulator — buyer and dealer can each reveal.
- The regulator recomputes: did the executed price beat every competing ask?
- Confidential pre-trade. Provable post-trade. Both, at once.
- This is the compliance obligation (MiFID-style best execution) that normally forces a transparent venue.
16 attestations live on DevnetVickrey · direct-OTC · partial
bisik.
Agentic commerce, for real
Two software agents negotiated and settled a live trade.
$ npm run agent:demo
· two market-maker agents quote blind
MarketMaker A 4,233,600 (+0.80%) — won
MarketMaker B 4,258,800 (+1.40%) — runner-up
· each agent's node holds only its OWN quote ✓
· buyer-agent awards; the ledger clears at
the SECOND price — 4,258,800
· TradeReport settled on Canton Devnet ✓
- No human sets the clearing price — the
Award choice does, on-ledger.
- Each dealer-agent is structurally blind to its rival: it cannot peek, because the data never reaches it.
- An MCP server exposes the desk to AI agents — five read tools plus
post_rfq, which posts a real RFQ on Devnet.
- An agent can verify Canton's privacy model for itself rather than take it on faith.
bisik.
Tokenized assets
A CIP-0056-shaped token standard, live on Devnet.
Holding
A standard, viewable position — with a real lock, so reserved state is visible to tooling.
TransferInstruction
Two-step transfer: propose → accept / reject / withdraw, with an expiry. Funds are never stranded.
Allocation → DvP
Reserve a leg, then settle two legs in one transaction. Neither side can claim unilaterally.
Deployed as its own package, verified on-ledger: a two-step transfer instruction and an atomic delivery-versus-payment swap, both executed live on Canton Devnet.
Honest scope: this is the standard's on-ledger shape, native. Full external-wallet registry interop (the Splice factory DARs) is the next step.
bisik.
Not a mock-up
Live on Canton Devnet — with a real book behind it.
Sovereigns (US, UK, Germany, Japan, France, Canada, Australia, Netherlands, Switzerland, Korea, Singapore), supranationals (World Bank, EIB, KfW), corporates (Apple, Microsoft, Nvidia, Goldman) and EM (Mexico, Brazil, India, Indonesia) — settled against tokenized cash, issuer-bound, atomic DvP.
desk bisik-otc v0.6.0 b0058535… parties bisik-v6-*
token bisik-token d969c045… transfer + atomic DvP verified
regulator {"TradeReport":41,"BasketTradeReport":5,"QuoteDisclosure":32}
dealerB sees only its own quotes ✓ privacy verified on-ledger
bisik.
Engineering rigor
The tests found real bugs. That is the point of having them.
Playwright drives the real UI, the live hosted build, and the MCP server over real JSON-RPC. CI gates a four-package Daml workspace on every push.
Caught by adversarial QA
- Escrow was unilaterally revocable — a dealer could pull collateral while its quote stayed live.
- No issuer binding — a dealer could quote a self-issued counterfeit bond.
- DvP was not atomic: a receiver could take a leg without delivering theirs.
- Each one is now a named regression test.
bisik.
Honest scope
What is guaranteed, and what is not.
Enforced on-ledger
- Rivals never receive each other's quotes.
- A dealer is never paid below its own ask.
- Both legs move, or neither does.
- Escrow cannot be pulled back unilaterally.
- A quote settles the RFQ it was made against — no other.
- Issuers are checked; counterfeits are rejected.
Left to the auctioneer
Only the buyer sees every sealed quote, so only the buyer can run the auction. It can curate the awarded set and clear at the winner's own ask — suppressing the Vickrey uplift, though never underpaying a dealer.
Forcing the true second price needs a trusted auctioneer or MPC — and MPC re-introduces exactly the cryptography Canton lets us skip. We would rather state the limit than overclaim.
bisik.
The confidential OTC desk that finally didn't need a cryptography stack —
because Canton already is one.
live desk bisik-eight.vercel.app/app
repository github.com/PugarHuda/bisik
network Canton Devnet · JSON Ledger API
bisik. — you whisper quotes. The market hears nothing.